italian elitist school, inc james burnham
power actions: + take assets + enslave: require work
What is the difference between mosca and Michel’s version of elite theory?
may’s theorem arrow’s impossibility theorem mckelvey schofield chaos theorem median voter theorem condorcet paradox condorcet jury theorem gibbard satterthwaite theorem
Politics game theory + Enforcement of rules + Setting of rules + voting on rules
international relations + realism + liberalism
identity politics on econ. form coalitions based on demographics, other factors. reinforcing. if others do it, you do it as defence. policies. official discrimination. types of identity. different groups have different policy preferences. eg religious groups. need narratives. oppressed, goals?
One period model, want to steal from other
multi period game, can punish if steal
application of prisoner dilemma
Can punish stealers collectively.
Can punish those who don’t punish.
Other equilibria:
+ Subset agree to coordinate, but allow stealing of outsiders
+ Coalition depends on heterogenous punishment costs
Stability of coalitions. Changes will be opposed by those in power. Stability of ruling coalition can be set in
condorcet
Members in ruling coaliton can vote
Want incentive to produce, so something to steal
Trade-off between growth and expropriation
Production can lead to changes in punishment costs. Coalition fragility
What are policy levers: + Taxes + Institutions
What determines equilibrium for both
Need to spend on defence/offence
Different equilibrium on taxes/institutions
Trade-off between internal and external security