SORT 2025

Introduction

Introduction

Private International Cartels Full Data 2019 edition + https://purr.purdue.edu/publications/2732/2

econ difference between collussion and cartels + legal diff, game theory diff

one monopoly price theorem

ramsey pricing here

maybe an h3 on power and taxation + lipsey and lancaster + diamond mirlees

split out page on structural reduced. + page on strucural reduced + page on estimated market demand elasticity (ie no power, monopsony) * could also do estimating supply elastiicty. assumptions are similar, perfect competition + estimate firm own price elasticity. has to be in IO * firms set price according to maximising, so if we know the markup, we know elasticity

h3 monopoly pricing

h3 horizontal homogenous

price agreements and game theory + game theory with price agreements in contract + game theory without price agreements in contract

welfare impact. consumer surplus vs consumer + producer surplus

explicit page on mergers. increase prices, but other models for efficiency.

modelling firm behavour, how much to produce

Measuring market power using market entry

price matching

modelling entry entry: 2 stage game. decide to enter, then decide to compete. 2 games. already incumbants, or no.

merger simulation on horizontal homogeneous + Counterfactual to merger: firm could fail, worse for market than merger + Merger simulation: comparative statics; structural models

Estimating markup: market share plus demand elasticity

h3 horizontal multi good

price dispersion. metric

defining market with + Full Equilibrium Relevant Market (FERM). Alternative to SSNIP. SSNIP celophane fallacy? by definition already profit maximising

Definition: contestable market

Can define markets more ad-hoc: eg travel to heathrow market, can use travel times to define

Market definition: geographic, product substitution

monopolistic competition

barriers to switching otherwise homogeneous goods and pricing renewing customers

producers of multiple homogeneous goods and bundling? does this require monopoly and so doesn’t fit here?

bundling: + grand bundling + mixed bundling (sell separately with discount for both.) always more profitable, better for consumers too

pure bundling: only sell bundling.

h3 monopsony

start with monopsony. show competitive is limit

h3 vertical

retail price maintenance vertical integration + margin squeeze + forclosure double margin exclusive dealing

pass through.

most favoured nation wide most favoured nation narrow

merger simulation in vertical

h3 networks

networks: + benefit goes up as users go up + could also have negative effects - congestion

competition between networks + multihoming + winner takes all - implications for investment

h3 on two sided markets + pricing