Private International Cartels Full Data 2019 edition + https://purr.purdue.edu/publications/2732/2
econ difference between collussion and cartels + legal diff, game theory diff
one monopoly price theorem
ramsey pricing here
maybe an h3 on power and taxation + lipsey and lancaster + diamond mirlees
split out page on structural reduced. + page on strucural reduced + page on estimated market demand elasticity (ie no power, monopsony) * could also do estimating supply elastiicty. assumptions are similar, perfect competition + estimate firm own price elasticity. has to be in IO * firms set price according to maximising, so if we know the markup, we know elasticity
price agreements and game theory + game theory with price agreements in contract + game theory without price agreements in contract
welfare impact. consumer surplus vs consumer + producer surplus
explicit page on mergers. increase prices, but other models for efficiency.
modelling firm behavour, how much to produce
Measuring market power using market entry
price matching
modelling entry entry: 2 stage game. decide to enter, then decide to compete. 2 games. already incumbants, or no.
merger simulation on horizontal homogeneous + Counterfactual to merger: firm could fail, worse for market than merger + Merger simulation: comparative statics; structural models
Estimating markup: market share plus demand elasticity
price dispersion. metric
defining market with + Full Equilibrium Relevant Market (FERM). Alternative to SSNIP. SSNIP celophane fallacy? by definition already profit maximising
Definition: contestable market
Can define markets more ad-hoc: eg travel to heathrow market, can use travel times to define
Market definition: geographic, product substitution
monopolistic competition
bundling: + grand bundling + mixed bundling (sell separately with discount for both.) always more profitable, better for consumers too
pure bundling: only sell bundling.
start with monopsony. show competitive is limit
retail price maintenance vertical integration + margin squeeze + forclosure double margin exclusive dealing
pass through.
most favoured nation wide most favoured nation narrow
merger simulation in vertical
networks: + benefit goes up as users go up + could also have negative effects - congestion
competition between networks + multihoming + winner takes all - implications for investment
h3 on two sided markets + pricing